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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

:
:

v.

:

ROGER ALLEN MALCOLM,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 20080781 -CA

:

Defendant/Appellant Roger Malcolm maintains the trial court erred when it failed
to instruct the jury on important concepts going to his theory of the case and his
manslaughter defenses. (Br. of Appellant). In connection with Malcolm's request for
instructions on extreme-emotional-distress manslaughter and imperfect-legal-justification
manslaughter, he requested instructions on a person's use of force in making a citizen's
arrest and use of force in expelling someone from property. Those instructions were
factually interconnected to the manslaughter alternatives at issue in this case.
Specifically, the facts show that a security guard, Verne Jenkins, used force to
make a citizen's arrest against Malcolm and/or to expel him from the convenience store
at Sapp Brothers Truck Stop. The evidence created a question of fact for the jury as to
whether Verne had the right to use force under the circumstances or whether his use of
force was illegal and unjustified and served to provoke Malcolm into a physical
confrontation. The jury should have been allowed to consider those issues in the correct
context and under the unique circumstances of this case. Where the evidence shows that
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Verne did not have the right to use force (even in his own store), the jury also could find
that his unjustified use of force would cause a reasonable person in Malcolm's position to
suffer overwhelming distress, and/or it would cause a reasonable person to believe he was
entitled to defend himself, although he may not be entitled to use deadly force. The
evidence in context would support manslaughter. See, e.g., Utah Code Ann. § 76-5203(4) (2008). Since the trial court refused to instruct the jury on the relevant issues, it
prevented the jury from considering whether Verne's actions in making an arrest or
expelling Malcolm from property were unlawful and unjustified, and whether the actions
provoked Malcolm for application of the manslaughter defenses. The trial court's ruling
resulted in prejudicial error. (Br. of Appellant, Arg.)
The State disagrees. First, it claims the instructions as a whole adequately advised
the jury of the law. (See Br. of Appellee, Arg. LB.) In support of that claim, the State
cites to the elements instructions for the greater and lesser offenses, an instruction that
dealt generally with use of force, and an instruction advising that a security guard is an
ordinary person. Malcolm does not take issue with those instructions. However, they do
not address the relevant concepts at issue here and based in the law: specifically, that
even an ordinary person does not have unbridled authority to use force in making a
citizen's arrest or in expelling someone from his own property. Since Verne Jenkins used
force to make a citizen's arrest or to expel Malcolm from the store, the jury should have
been allowed to consider whether such force was unjustified, and whether it triggered
application of the manslaughter alternatives.

2

Second, the State claims Malcolm's evidence failed to support the requested
instructions. According to the State, Malcolm's testimony about an accidental shooting
was inconsistent with the manslaughter defenses. (7#., Arg. I.C.) The State's argument is
irrelevant and misplaced since the specific instructions for manslaughter are not at issue
here. Moreover, Malcolm's requested instructions for use of force to expel and to arrest
would have been particularly relevant to the jury in considering whether Verne Jenkins
used unwarranted force to make an arrest or to remove Malcolm from the premises. The
requested instructions in context would require the jury to consider Verne's actions. That
issue is separate from the issue of whether the shooting was an accident.
Third, the State seems to claim that the trial court's failure to provide the requested instructions resulted in harmless error because Malcolm was able to present his
theory of the case to the jury through evidence and closing argument, and the evidence
failed to support the manslaughter alternatives. (Br. of Appellee, Arg. I.D.) Again, the
State's arguments are misplaced. Under the law, where the evidence and the defendant's
theory support the instructions, the trial court is required to give them. Failure to do so
results in prejudice since the jury has not been adequately informed of its responsibilities
under the law. In addition, based on the record here, the trial court approved instructions
for the manslaughter alternatives. Consequently, that is not an issue before this Court.
For the reasons set forth below, and as more fully set forth in the Brief of
Appellant, Malcolm respectfully requests that this Court reverse the conviction and
remand the case for a new trial where he may be given the opportunity to present
instructions to the jury relating to his theory of the case and the manslaughter defenses.
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ARGUMENT
THE STATE SEEMS TO CLAIM MALCOLM WAS NOT ENTITLED TO
JURY INSTRUCTIONS ON HIS DEFENSE WHERE HE WAS
OTHERWISE ABLE TO PRESENT HIS DEFENSE THROUGH
EVIDENCE AND ARGUMENT. YET UNDER THE LAW, THE TRIAL
COURT HAS A DUTY TO INSTRUCT THE JURY IN THAT INSTANCE.
Malcolm maintains the conviction here should be reversed for a new trial where he
may be allowed to present his requested instructions for use of force in making a citizen's
arrest and use of force in expelling someone from property. (See R. 139; 140 (requested
instructions); 207:389-93, 395-97 (arguing for the proposed jury instructions); 207:43839 (reflecting evidence supporting the instructions)).
Under Utah law, and as a matter of fundamental fairness, a defendant has the right
to have his "theory of the case presented to the jury in a clear and understandable way"
with relevant jury instructions. State v. Potter\ 627 P.2d 75, 78 (Utah 1981); see also
State v. Ontiveros, 835 P.2d 201, 205 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) (stating the defendant has a
right to have his "theory of the case presented to the jury in a clear and comprehensible
manner"); State v. Aly, 782 P.2d 549, 550 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (stating "[a] criminal
defendant is entitled to have the gist of his defense reflected in the instructions given to
the jury, and the instructions should not incorrectly or misleadingly state the material
rules of law"); Jorzensen v. Issa, 739 P.2d 80, 82 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) (stating "[a] party
is clearly entitled to have the jury instructed on his theory of the case"); Utah Const, art.
I, § 7 (ensuring due process); U.S. Const, amend XIV, § 1 (same).
Moreover, a trial court "has a duty to instruct the jury on the relevant law." State
v. Low, 2008 UT 58, \ 27, 192 P.3d 867; see also State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232, 238

4

(Utah 1992) (stating the trial court has the duty to instruct on the law applicable to the
case); State v. Castillo, 457 P.2d 618, 620 (Utah 1969) (stating a defendant is entitled to
have the jury instructed "fully and clearly" on the law of his defense). "The purpose of
the instructions is to set forth the issues and the law applicable thereto in a clear, concise
and orderly manner, so that the jury will understand how to discharge its
responsibilities." State v. Torres, 619 P.2d 694, 696 (Utah 1980).
In this case, the State claims Malcolm was not entitled to have the jury instructed
on use of force to make an arrest, or use of force to expel a person from property because
the jury charge as a whole adequately advised the jury on the law; because Malcolm
testified that the shooting was an accident; and because Malcolm was not prejudiced by
the lack of jury instructions where he was able to present evidence and closing arguments
for his defense. (See Br. of Appellee, Arg.) The State's arguments are unavailing.
A. CONTRARY TO THE STATE'S CLAIMS, THE JURY CHARGE AS A
WHOLE WAS INSUFFICIENT.
The State claims the instruction charge as a whole adequately advised the jury of
all pertinent issues relating to Malcolm's defense. (See Br. of Appellee, Arg. I.B.2.) In
support of that claim, the State cites to the jury instruction for the "elements of murder"
(id. at 25); the instructions describing extreme-emotional-distress manslaughter (uL at 2526); the instructions for imperfect-legal-justification manslaughter (icL at 26-27); an
instruction discussing when force is or is not justified in general, including that a person
is not justified in using force if he "'initially provoke[d] the use of force'" or if he "cwas
the aggressor'" (uL at 26-27); the instructions for self defense (UL at 27-28); and an
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instruction advising the jury that a "'security guard who is not a certified peace officer
has only the same rights and privileges afforded to any ordinary person."' (IcL at 28; see
also Br. of Appellant, Arg. C. (discussing the jury charge as a whole and as inadequate)).
The State claims those instructions were adequate: "if the jury accepted Malcolm's claim
that he was voluntarily leaving the store when Jenkins unjustifiably attacked him, the
court's instructions clearly allowed the jury to fully consider whether that unjustifiable
attack provoked an 'extreme emotional distress' for which 'there was a reasonable
explanation or excuse.'" (Br. of Appellee, 28).
Yet the instructions were deficient. They failed to advise the jury that contrary to
any notion about common law rights - see, e.g., Gregory Y. Titelman, Random House
Dictionary of Popular Proverbs and Savings, 223 (Random House 1996) (stating the
phrase "et domus sua cuique tutissimum refugium (onefs home is the safest refuge for
all)" means "[y]ou are the boss in your own house and nobody can tell you what to do
there"); see also William and Mary Morris, Morris Dictionary of Word and Phrase
Origins, 368 (Harper Collins 1977) (stating the phrase, "[a] man's home is his castle" is
"as old as the basic concepts of English common law") - a man may not do as he pleases
in his own home or shop, and the same goes for a security guard charged with protecting
the shop. Indeed, Utah statutory law specifies the extent to which a person, a shopkeeper,
or an ordinary person responsible for protecting property may use force to make an arrest
or to expel someone from the premises. Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-2-403, 76-2-406 (2008);
(see Br. of Appellant, Arg. A. (stating a person may use force under certain
circumstances to expel another from property; likewise, a person may use force under
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certain circumstances to make an arrest)); State v. Quada, 918 P.2d 883 (Utah Ct. App.
1996) (ruling defendant's convictions for aggravated assault would stand where the
defendant used unlawful force against persons on his own property).
In this case, the trial court explained that the jury must consider whether Malcolm
acted intentionally or knowingly (R. 171 (instructions for murder); 173; 177 (instructions
for manslaughter alternatives)); whether Malcolm acted under the influence of extreme
emotional distress that was not substantially caused by his own conduct (R. 172-76
(instruction for extreme-emotional-distress manslaughter)); whether Malcolm reasonably
believed the circumstances allowed him to defend himself although he was not justified
in using deadly force (R. 177-79 (instructions for imperfect-legal-justification
manslaughter); see also R. 187 (setting forth factors in determining imminence or
reasonableness including the nature of the danger, the level of the unlawful force, prior
acts or propensities, and the history of the parties)); whether Malcolm acted negligently
(R. 181); and whether Malcolm acted in perfect self defense (R. 185-94).
Also, the court explained that a person may use force when he reasonably believes
it is necessary to defend himself against the unlawful use of force by another; and he may
use deadly force (for perfect self defense) if it is necessary to prevent death or serious
bodily injury. (R. 185). Likewise, the court advised the jury that a person may not use
force if he "initially provoke[d] the use of force against himself with the intent to use
force as an excuse to inflict" harm; if he attempted to commit, committed, or was fleeing
from the commission of a crime; or if he were the aggressor. (R. 186). Those
instructions were relevant, yet they failed to explain when a person may use force to
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make a citizen's arrest or to remove a person from his own property. (See R. 155-99).
They failed to explain that while Verne had a duty to protect the store, he was not at
liberty under the law to initiate an aggressive and physical encounter in order to arrest or
to remove Malcolm from the store. (See R. 155-99 (J ur y instructions); see also Br. of
Appellant, Arg. C.) And where Verne engaged in such conduct, the jury should have
been allowed to consider whether Verne's conduct was unlawful even in his own store.
(Br. of Appellant, Args. A. and B.)
Since the trial court rejected the requested instructions, the jury was not allowed to
consider whether Verne's conduct in tackling Malcolm to the ground for a citizen's arrest
or to expel him from the store was excessive and unlawful, thereby provoking Malcolm
for application of the manslaughter alternatives. (See Br. of Appellant, Arg. C.) Without
instructions on those relevant concepts, the jury likely believed that a man's home or his
shop is his castle: that Verne Jenkins - an ordinary man serving as a store security guard
- was justified in protecting the store with use of force, even though Malcolm was
already in the process of leaving the store. (See Br. of Appellant, Arg. C.) In that regard,
the jury charge as a whole was incomplete amd misleading.
Next, the State suggests that Malcolm's requested instructions may have worked
to "cut against" his manslaughter defense. (Br. of Appellee, 29). According to the State,
if the jury believed Verne was trying to make "what he thought was" a legitimate arrest,
it also may believe Malcolm's response was unreasonable. (Id.) The State's claim is
speculative and irrelevant. It is speculative because under the circumstances, if the trial
court had instructed the jury as Malcolm requested, it is likely that the jury would have
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considered the facts in context to find that Verne Jenkins initiated an aggressive physical
attack that provoked Malcolm. (See, e.g.* Br. of Appellant, Arg. D.) The State's claim is
irrelevant because under the law, Malcolm was "entitled to have the jury instructed on his
theory of the case." Jorzensen* 739 P.2d at 82; Utah Const, art. I, § 7 (ensuring due
process); U.S. Const, amend. XIV, § 1 (same). Proper instructions would have ensured
fairness. This Court may reject the State's speculative possibilities and claims on appeal.
B. THE STATE CLAIMS MALCOLM'S TESTIMONY ABOUT AN
ACCIDENTAL SHOOTING WAS INCONSISTENT WITH HIS REQUESTED
INSTRUCTIONS. THE STATE'S ARGUMENT IS MISPLACED.
The State claims that Malcolm's testimony was inconsistent with the requested
instructions because Malcolm "was adamant that he did not intend to shoot Jenkins at
all." (Br. of Appellee, 30). The State's argument is misplaced since the jury was
required to deliberate several issues in the case. First, it was required to consider whether
Verne Jenkins was justified in using physical force against Malcolm. (R. 207:395-96,
397 (stating the jury would have to resolve issues surrounding Verne Jenkins's conduct)).
In that regard, it was required to consider whether Verne's use of force was unlawful and
provoked Malcolm. (See, e.z.. R. 207:393, 395-97); State v. Ross, 501 P.2d 632, 635
(Utah 1972) (stating provocation is an element for the jury). Malcolm's requested jury
instructions on the use of force to make an arrest or to expel a person from property
related to that issue, and would have allowed the jury to consider whether Verne was
unjustified in using force in his own shop. (See R. 139-40 (requested instructions);
207:389-98 (discussing instructions)). Consequently, the trial court should have given
the requested instructions to the jury.
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Second, the jury was required to consider whether Malcolm responded to Verne's
conduct by intentionally or accidentally shooting him. (R. 171 (instructing jury on
several elements, including intentional and knowing conduct); 173 (same); 177 (same);
181 (instructing the jury on several elements, including negligence)); see also State v.
Spillers, 2007 UT 13, ^[ 16, 23, 152 P.3d 315 (recognizing that the manslaughter
alternatives apply if defendant acted intentionally in response to an attack by another);
State v. Shumwav, 2002 UT 124, Iffl 11-13, 14, 63 P.3d 94 (same); State v. Padilla* 776
P.2d 1329, 1330 (Utah 1989) (recognizing that extreme-emotional-distress manslaughter
incorporates the heat-of-passion standard). Where the State claims on appeal that
Malcolm "was adamant that he did not intend to shoot Jenkins" (Br. of Appellee, 30),
those facts would have been pertinent to the jury in considering Malcolm's state of mind;
and that is an issue separate and distinct from Verne's unjustified use of force.
Third, the jury was required to consider whether Malcolm's intentional or
accidental conduct was justified for purposes of a perfect self defense, or was unjustified
for a criminal conviction. (See, e.g., R. 193-94 (defining perfect self defense); 177-IS
(defining imperfect legal justification)). If the jury had been allowed to consider the facts
in the context of the requested instructions, it likely would have found that Verne Jenkins,
an ordinary person acting as security guard, was not justified in using force against
another even where Verne was responsible for protecting the property. The jury then
would consider whether Malcolm's response was lawful for perfect self defense; or
unlawful and intentional or accidental for a criminal conviction.
In sum, Malcolm's testimony about the accidental nature of the shooting in no way
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conflicted with his requested instructions for use of force to make an arrest or to expel a
person from property. See Spillers, 2007 UT 13, ]f 19 (recognizing that a defendant is
entitled to requested instructions even where there are "ambiguities or inconsistencies" in
the evidence) (emphasis added). This Court may reject the State's arguments on appeal.
C. UNDER THE PREJUDICE STANDARD. THE TRIAL COURT IS REQUIRED TO GIVE THE REQUESTED INSTRUCTIONS IF THE EVIDENCE
AND THE DEFENDANT'S THEORY SUPPORT THE INSTRUCTIONS.
(1) The State fs Argument Misunderstands the Prejudice Analysis,
The State claims the trial court's failure to instruct the jury on Malcolm's theory of
the case "was harmless [error] because Malcolm fully argued his manslaughter theories to
the jury" through evidence and in closing argument. (Br. of Appellee, 31). That claim
should be rejected for three reasons. First, it disregards the law. According to the Utah
Supreme Court, if the defendant's evidence and closing arguments support the requested
instructions, the trial court is not relieved under the prejudice prong from instructing the
jury on the issues - as the State claims (Br. of Appellee, 31). Rather, the trial court has a
"duty" in that instance to instruct the jury on the issues. See_ Potter, 627 P.2d at 78.
"Encompassed in this duty is the right of the defendant to have his theory of the case
presented to the jury in a clear and understandable way." Id, (footnote omitted); see also
Low, 2008 UT 58, f 25 (stating "the court is obligated to give the instruction if evidence
has been presented - either by the prosecution or by the defendant - that provides any
reasonable basis upon which a jury could conclude that the affirmative defense applies to
the defendant") (emphasis added; citation omitted); State v. Valdez, 604 P.2d 472, 473
(Utah 1979) (stating "[i]t is defendant's right to have the jury instructed on his theory of
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the case so long as the requested instruction is warranted by the evidence presented at
trial").1 Also, "[t]o facilitate clarity," the trial court should relate the instructions "to the
specific facts of the case. By doing this the court can effectively guard against the jury
being misled or confusing" the concepts. Potter, 627 P.2d at 79-78.
Second, under the law, the trial court's failure to give the requested instructions
results in presumptive prejudice: "'failing to instruct on the lesser included offense
presumptively affects the outcome of the trial. . . [and] our confidence in the verdict is
undermined.'" Spillers, 2007 UT 13, f 24 (emphasis added; quoting State v. Knight,
2003 UT App 354, ^ 17, 79 P.3d 969); see also Potter, 627 P.2d at 78 (stating defendant
was denied a fair trial "on the critical issues of the case" where the instructions were "so
general" they "could have misled and confused the jury"). In this case, where the
evidence was in dispute and it supported the requested instructions, the circumstances
supported prejudice. See Spillers, 2007 UT 13, f 24; (Br. of Appellant, Arg. D.)

1

In assessing whether the trial court should have given Malcolm's requested
instructions, this Court will view the facts and the reasonable inferences "cin the light
most favorable to the defense.'" Spillers, 2007 UT 13, % 10 (citation omitted). Also, this
Court will decide "whether there is a sufficient quantum of evidence presented to justify
sending the question to the jury, a decision which must be made concerning all jury
instructions in any trial." State v. Baker, 671 P.2d 152, 159 (Utah 1983).
To be clear, Malcolm was not obligated in this case to present the evidence for the
requested instructions or to prove their relevance to the jury for the manslaughter alternatives. Se£ Spillers, 2007 UT 13, ^f 19. "A defendant is not required to testify at all, nor
is he required to present any evidence at trial; he cmay simply point to ambiguities or
inconsistencies in the evidence presented by the State and require the State to prove every
element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.'" IdL (citation omitted). "[A]
defendant in a criminal case bears no burden of persuasion." I(L (citation omitted).
"cThe ultimate burden of proving the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt
remains on the state, whether defendant offers any evidence in an effort to prove
affirmative defenses or not.'" I(L (citation omitted).
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And third, contrary to the State's assertion, defense counsel's closing argument
was not a sufficient substitute for the requested instructions. Specifically, the trial court
instructed the jury that it must take the law set forth "in the instructions" and apply that
law "to the facts" of the case. (R. 155). Also, the court specified that "[a]ll the
instructions are important" (id.), while the lawyers are simply "advocating their views of
the case. What they may have said at any time during these proceedings and what they
say during their closing arguments is not evidence. . . . If they say anything about the law
that conflicts with these instructions, you are to rely on these instructions." (R. 157). In
that regard, where the instructions as a whole failed to contain relevant concepts (see Br.
of Appellant, Arg. C ; see also supra, Arg. A.), the jury has not properly advised.
In short, the evidence and defense counsel's closing arguments supported
Malcolm's requested instructions in this case. (See Br. of Appellee, Args. I.A.2. and
I.A.3. (acknowledging that the evidence and defense counsel's arguments supported the
instructions)). Those circumstances militate in favor of giving the instructions. (See Br.
of Appellant, Arg. D.) In this case, Malcolm's requested instructions would have given
the jury context and guidance. (See, e.g., R. 155 (instructing the jury that it must decide
the facts from the evidence and it must "take the law I give you in the instructions" and
"apply it to the facts")). They were pertinent to his defense. See Spillers, 2007 UT 13, f
19 (stating as long as evidence supports defendant's theory, he "is entitled to the jury
instruction if he requests it"). The trial court erred in failing to give the requested
instructions. See Ontiveros, 835 P.2d at 205 (stating the court has a duty to instruct the
jury on the law applicable to the facts).
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(2) The State's Prejudice Analysis Misapprehends the Law for ExtremeEmotional-Distress Manslaughter and Imperfect-Legal-Justification
Manslaughter.
Next, the State claims the error was harmless because the evidence
"overwhelmingly negated any finding that Malcolm acted under an extreme emotional
disturbance or that he reasonably believed that he was legally justified." (Br. of
Appellee, 31). The State's claims are misplaced for several reasons. First, in support of
its claim, the State attempts to marshal the evidence for the conviction. (See Br. of
Appellee, 31-33). Yet the standard for marshaling evidence in favor of the conviction has
no place here. The Utah Supreme Court has ruled that in considering whether the
defendant is entitled to have the jury instructed on his defense, it will view the evidence
and inferences "'in the light most favorable to the defense.'" Spillers^ 2007 UT 13, \ 10
(emphasis added); (see also supra note 1, herein).
Second, the State's claims seem to attack the specific instructions for extremeemotional-distress manslaughter and imperfect-legal-justification manslaughter. (Br. of
Appellee, 32-33 (stating Malcolm did not suffer distress, and the evidence failed to
support imperfect legal justification)). Yet the trial court considered the evidence to be
sufficient to support those particular instructions, and they are not at issue here. (See R.
172-80). Rather, the issue is whether the evidence supports instructions for use of force
to make a citizen's arrest or to expel someone from property. (See Br. of Appellant, Arg.;
see also R. 139; 140 (requested instructions)). In this case, the trial court acknowledged
the jury would have to resolve issues relating to force and provocation. (See R. 207:39597). Yet the court refused to give Malcolm's instructions relating to those issues. (See R.
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207:397). That was error. State v. Johnson, 185 P.2d 738, 744 (Utah 1947) (citing cases
from other states to support that when the evidence raises questions going to justification
or provocation, the jury should be instructed on the matter); State v. Law, 147 P.2d 324,
327 (Utah 1944) (whether defendant had a reasonable basis to believe his adversary
would take his life or do him great harm was a jury question); State v. Turner, 79 P.2d 46,
52, 54 (Utah 1938) (whether defendant's adversary provoked him was a jury question).
Third, where extreme-emotional-distress manslaughter and imperfect-legaljustification manslaughter are relevant to the analysis, the State's arguments concerning
those forms of manslaughter misapprehend the law. Indeed, the State claims that
evidence of Verne grabbing "Malcolm on the shoulder or about the neck" does not
support a "'provocative act'" and extreme emotional distress manslaughter. (Br. of
Appellee, 32). Yet the evidence supports manslaughter. The evidence shows that before
the shooting, Malcolm was agitated and flustered at being ignored in the conveniencestore area of the truck stop. (SeeR. 206:118, 138; seeaho> 206:78-79, 95, 101, 139, 146
(stating Malcolm asked, "Why can't I get any service around here?"); 206:155 (stating
Malcolm was loud and belligerent); 206:171). Verne Jenkins responded by telling
Malcolm to leave. (R. 206:79, 103; see also 206: 97-98 (stating Malcolm may have said,
"All this is just for a piece of gum. All I want is gum." And Verne said, "No, you are
being rude. You need to leave."); 206:141-42 (stating Verne asked Malcolm to calm
down or leave and he used an authoritative tone)).
As Malcolm was collecting his bicycle from the Burger King area to leave (R.
207:457-58), Verne used force and initiated a physical altercation against him. (R.
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206:79-80, 93, 146-47; 207:458-61, 483-84). Veme had Malcolm in a headlock and tried
to take him to the ground. (R. 206:124-25, 127 (statmg Veme tried to take Malcolm
down); 206:131-32 (stating Veme placed Malcolm in a headlock to detain him and to get
him to leave); 206:142-43 (stating Malcolm went over to his bike and Veme grabbed him
by the shoulder and the men "got in a scuffle"); 206:147, 157-58 (stating the struggle
started when "Vern[e] was trying to get his hands on [Malcolm]" to get him out of the
store; and describing Veme as having his arm in front of Malcolm's chest)).
Veme used physical force to detain Malcolm or to make a citizen's arrest as
Malcolm was trying to leave; also Veme used physical force to expel Malcolm from the
premises. (See R. 208:546-48 (prosecutor recounted witness testimony that,Veme tried
to "detain" or "restrain" Malcolm; and Veme used force in an effort to get Malcolm "to
leave the store" after Malcolm mumbled something); 208:564-65 (prosecutor claimed
that the "only mistake Veme made" was in trying to restrain Malcolm)). The evidence
viewed "'in the light most favorable to the defense,'" Spillers, 2007 UT 13, \ 10 (citation
omitted), supports the manslaughter alternatives. See id. at ^j 12, 16-23
In addition, it supports that the jury should have been instructed as to when a
person may use force to make a citizen's arrest and/or to expel someone from their own
property. {See R. 139; 140 (requested instructions)). Malcolm's requested instructions
would have allowed the jury to consider concepts relevant to extreme-emotional-distress
manslaughter: whether Verne's force was unlawful and excessive, and therefore
provoked Malcolm into the attack. See Spillers, 2007 UT 13, Tffl 16, 23; Shumway, 2002
UT 124, Iflf 11-13, 14; see also Johnson, 185 P.2d at 744 (stating the jury should be
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instructed when the evidence raises questions going to justification or provocation);
Tamer, 79 F2d at 52, 54 (stating the issue of pro vocation is for the jury).
Also, the requested instructions would have allowed the jury to consider concepts
relevant to imperfect-legal-justification manslaughter: whether Verne's excessive and
unlawful force would cause a reasonable person to believe he was entitled to defend
himself, although he may not be entitled to "escalateQ" the altercation with "deadly
force" where "Jenkins was unarmed." (Br. of Appellee, 33, 32); see also Spillers, 2007
UT 13, ^f 22 (discussing imperfect-legal-justification manslaughter).2 Those
circumstances support the manslaughter alternatives as well as the requested instructions
tor use of force m making an arrest or expeffmg someone from property.
Finally, the State repeats some of its earlier arguments and claims Malcolm was
not entitled to the requested instructions because he was "'perfectly calm' and 'relaxed'"
immediately after the shooting, Verne's aggressive conduct was not sufficient to provoke
distress, the shooting was an accident, and Malcolm was not justified in escalating the
altercation or using deadly force. (Br. of Appellee, 32-33). Yet Malcolm's "'perfectly

2

The State seems to claim that for imperfect-legal-justification manslaughter, the
evidence would have to support that Malcolm reasonably believed "he was entitled to use
deadly force," {See Br. of Appellee, 33; see also id. at 32). Yet the imperfect-le^aljustification form of manslaughter applies "when the defendant caused another's death
'under a reasonable belief that the circumstances provided a legal justification or excuse
for his conduct although the conduct was not legally justifiable or excusable under the
existing circumstances"' Spillers, 2007 UT 13, ^ 22 (emphasis added; citation omitted).
Consequently, if the defendant believed he was entitled to defend himself but he was not
entitled to use deadly force, manslaughter applies. I(L
On the other hand, if the evidence supports that the defendant reasonably believed
he was Entitled to use deadly force, those facts "create, a question of fact" for the jury for
a perfect self defense. Spillers, 2007 UT 13, \ 23.
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calm' and 'relaxed'" demeanor (id.) after the shooting is irrelevant. (See R. 176
(instructing the jury that it must consider the issue of distress "under the then existing
circumstances," i.e., at the time of the shooting); 192 (instructing the jury that it may not
judge the defendant based on "after-developed events")). Also, Verne's conduct in
slamming Malcolm to the floor was sufficient to give rise to extreme distress. See
Spillers, 2007 UT 13, ff 16-20 (stating evidence of a verbal dispute followed by the
victim's attack is sufficient to support the defendant's distress) (see also R. 172-80 (the
trial court instructed the jury on the manslaughter alternatives)). In addition, the
accidental or intentional nature of the shooting is a separate issue. (See supra, Arg. B.,
herein). And evidence that Malcolm believed he could defend himself, but lacked
justification to use deadly force, supports the imperfect-legal-justification manslaughter
alternative. Spillers, 2007 UT 13, \ 22 (stating manslaughter applies when the defendant
was not justified in using deadly force) (see also supra, note 2, herein).
In sum, the trial court recognized that issues of provocation and unlawful force
were "'in dispute'" and for the jury to decide. Spillers, 2007 UT 13, ^ 24; (R. 207:39597). In addition, the State's brief concedes that evidence was consistent with defendant's
theory of the case. (See Br. of Appellee, 21-22 (stating defendant presented evidence on
his theory and closing argument); see also Br. of Appellant, Arg. B. (stating evidence
supported instructions as to when a person can make a citizen's arrest with force, and
when a person may be justified in using force to expel another from property)).
Moreover, at trial, the jury found Malcolm guilty of intentional homicide. (See R. 202).
Those circumstances are consistent with evidence that Verne, an ordinary person acting
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as a security guard, may not have been justified in using force to make a citizen's arrest
or to expel someone even from property he protected, and that such force provoked
Malcolm for application of the manslaughter alternatives. (Br. of Appellant, Arg.)
While the evidence may be consistent with other theories or defenses, that does
not undermine the importance of Malcolm's requested instructions here. As the Utah
Supreme Court has recognized, "'Society has a legitimate interest in the juryfs freedom to
act according to the evidence.' Where the defendant requests an instruction of a lesserincluded or a related offense and where there is some rational basis in the evidence on
which the jury could find as the defendant requests, the instruction must be given." State
v. Hansen. 734 P.2d 421, 424 (Utah 1986) (citation omitted). "A primary purpose of a
criminal trial is the vindication of the laws of a civilized society against those who are
guilty of transgressing those laws. The process, however, must be based on procedures
which are consonant with fairness both to the defendant and the State." State v. HowelL
649 P.2d 91, 94 (Utah 1982). "It is the duty of the judge to instruct the jury on [the] relevant law." Hansen, 734 P.2d at 428. The law on instructions "is not a mere technical rule
designed to trip up judges and prosecutors. It serves a fundamental policy of permitting
the jury to find a defendant guilty of any offense that fits the facts" and the law. Hansen,
734 P.2d at 424. If the trial court fails in its duty, the jury will never be "given the
choice," icl_ at 428, of considering the appropriate outcome for the case. Here, the trial
court rejected Malcolm's requested instructions and effectively prevented the jury from
considering his theory of the case under the law. That resulted in prejudicial error.
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth herein and in the Brief of Appellant, Malcolm respectfully requests that this Court reverse the conviction and remand the case for a new trial.
SUBMITTED this

V^

day of September, 2009.
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